Drawing from the concept of citizenship in the novel, Starship Troopers, we consider public opinion in a world in which "service guarantees citizenship." We do this by examining the political attitudes of U.S. (volunteer) veterans-a group generally neglected in the public opinion literature-relative to the adult population at large.
Introduction
In his classic novel, Starship Troopers, Robert Heinlein describes a society in which citizenship-and consequently, the political franchise-is available only to those who have completed a term of voluntary federal service, which requires an individual to perform potentially dangerous tasks under military discipline. 1 A service requirement improves the citizenry in two ways: it acts primarily as a selection mechanism, weeding out those who are unable or unwilling to fulfill the obligations that come with political power; it is also meant to enhance any existing civic virtue in volunteers, and to foster a fundamental understanding of duty and honor in the context of the state. In short, service identifies individuals who would make superior citizens and makes them even better. By making it a prerequisite for citizenship, the state fundamentally increases the likelihood that sovereignty falls to those best suited to the job. The creation of an electorate that exhibits preferred virtues and political attitudes, in turn, leads to a more stable and better functioning state.
Because of its rigors, "federal service" in this context can only be comparable to military service within the American context. For this reason, Heinlein's citizens must be analogous to American veterans. 2 It is not clear how (if at all) one might assess Heinlein's key claim that an electorate comprised entirely of veterans would lead to a government that ran more smoothly, and current research into veterans' political opinions has tended to ignore volunteer veterans in the mass public entirely.
However, the proposition raises a number of interesting questions that we believe deserve consideration as a first step toward understanding what causes veterans' differentiated attitudes 34 . In particular, we wonder what public opinion about policy issues would look like under such a system, as well as if the empirically verifiable components of Heinlein's theory of citizenship are supported.
We use Heinlein's claims about the policies of the Terran Federation as a theoretical dropping-off point for the investigation of veterans' attitudes on a variety of domestic and military matters. We derive a series of hypotheses about veterans attitudes, based on the theoretical claims, which we test using data from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). We rely on an array of demographic characteristics and summary statistics to determine whether and to what degree veterans' political attitudes differ from the general public. Finally, we use our findings to argue that it is necessary to dig deeper under the surface with new data that can isolate the effects of socialization and selection on veterans'
attitudes, and can uncover the differences between subgroups of the population of veterans.
Previous Research
In building a society governed solely by veterans, Heinlein engages in a fascinating thought experiment.
The question of what a Heinleinian society might look like in the real world is interesting in itself, but this is accentuated by the fact that veterans tend to be an understudied group within the public opinion literature. This is somewhat surprising, given that veterans make up more than one-tenth of the U.S. population, and that military service is often seen as an especially formative part of an individual's transition into adulthood. As such, veterans make up a significant-and theoretically distinct-subset of the American electorate. Veterans make up a similar proportion of the American population as Hispanics, blacks, and the poor, 5 but the political behavior and attitudes of these other groups have been studied to a significantly greater degree.
It is notable that while veterans are usually acknowledged to have distinct beliefs and behaviors as citizens, as well as qualities that set them apart as candidates for and occupants of public office, the study of veteran politics is underdeveloped. A recent examination of the literature on veterans in this journal pointed out that more research is needed on the study of veterans as a distinct voting bloc, and that a reassessment of the findings of veterans research from the Vietnam conscription era among veterans from the volunteer military is necessary. 6 The very definition of the term "veteran" is ambiguous in the literature, as governments in different countries may not officially designate an individual as a veteran until certain service lengths have been reached or an individual has been deployed to a combat zone. In other cases, such as China (and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union) in the mid-20 th century, the government has used its power to redefine the term for political reasons. 7 Furthermore, as research conducted in the UK demonstrates, public opinion differs on whether anyone who serves is a veteran, or if the term should be reserved for older generations, such as those who fought in the either of the two World Wars. 8 While some research does exist on public opinion of veterans, it tends to be relatively narrow in scope, or to have a fairly parochial sample group. Little extant research looks at the general political views of veterans at a mass level.
Of the political studies of veterans that do exist, a number have concentrated primarily on turnout and voting behavior. In terms of turnout, the very factors that Heinlein illuminates for their importance in generating good citizens (commitment to duty, civic virtue) may lead veterans to differ systematically from the general population. Those who elect to join the military may have an inherently higher affinity for their country and be more willing to make sacrifices on its behalf, such as paying the cost to vote. 9 Additionally, as a socialization mechanism, the military is an "insulated institution that makes specific efforts to inculcate its members with patriotism." 10 This should have the effect of either amplifying the characteristics described above, or instilling those that are absent. These factors together should predispose veterans toward participation, making them, ceteris paribus, more likely to vote than nonveterans. Indeed, research into the subject finds this generally to be true.
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In studies of vote choice, the special qualities of veterans again surface, this time as an explanation for veterans' general affinity for the Republican Party. 23 Additionally, the justice system adopts a policy of public corporal retribution against criminals rather than rehabilitation 24 and officially believes in expansionism, under the axiom that a species' right to territory is dependent on its ability to defend that territory. 25 Thus, the policies of the Federation appear to tend toward laissez-faire economic policy, hawkish foreign policy, and a tolerant social policy, with the exception of the use of corporal punishment. If we make the assumption that these policies generally reflect those of the median citizen in the Federation, Heinlein's statements imply that this median citizen (i.e., the median veteran) is essentially a hawkish libertarian. As we can assess the preferences of the median veteran in the U.S., this claim lends itself to empirical analysis.
Heinlein discusses the selection mechanism by which voluntary military service identifies individuals who are willing to make sacrifices for the community in some depth in the book, with the opening quote to this paper serving as one prominent example. Citizens are defined by their willingness to take responsibility for the security of society, subordinating their own desires to that of the public and its legitimately chosen officers, and they are exclusively identified through voluntary service. The bridge between his general claim that service selects individuals with a stronger innate sense of duty and the apparent hawkish libertarian political beliefs of those individuals is left poorly defined on Heinlein's part, and the rationale is not immediately clear.
An especiall y plausibl e ex plan ation can be found i n the fals e con sensu s effect, whereb y individuals tend to view their own tendencies as common or moral traits. 26 In general accordance with the false consensus effect identified by Ross et al., individuals with a strong sense of duty should tend to believe that most others have the selfsame sense of duty. 27 The false consensus effect should lead individuals who strongly value duty to expect the same not only of others in the military world, but of civilians as well. If this is true, then these dutiful individuals can also be expected to assume that all people will take action on their own to serve society, free of coercion. 28 It is important, however, to distinguish between dutifulness and altruism. Dutiful individuals defer to institutional authority, while altruistic individuals may be more likely to adopt the liberal view that institutions are corrupting influences. Dutiful individuals, then, should assume that all people will serve society voluntarily, whether individually or within institutions.
This expectation carries implications for domestic policy preferences. If others can be trusted to serve the public good voluntarily, there is little need to use government action to compel them to contribute to public goods or follow conscientious business. This suggests that veterans should express laissez-faire positions on economic policy. Also, since dutiful individuals believe others can be trusted to make responsible, public-minded decisions in their personal lives, veterans should be fairly liberal socially.
A person who finds it easier to make sacrifices for the good of others would likely also find it easier to bear the costs of war, even in a non-military role, and believe that warfare is less costly than individuals who are not as duty-minded. Under these assumptions, such hawkish libertarian policies seem the natural best choice of the Federation citizen, as individuals would be trustworthy enough to handle their own moral development and social
welfare, unless they demonstrate a deficient sense of duty. In light of this discussion, it seems unsurprising that in the Federation, "the basis of all morality is duty." 29 With a few assumptions to bridge the gap, Heinlein's statements imply that voluntary military service should be a powerful indicator of a strong sense of duty, which will translate into hawkish libertarian policy preferences. 30 Thus, by the means of the selection mechanism outlined by Heinlein, we should expect veterans to be more fiscally conservative, socially permissive, and willing to support the use of military force than the population at large. Portions of this claim have found some support in a study by Bachman et al., which found that high school students who were planning to enlist exhibited significantly more conservative beliefs. 31 As ideology is a strong predictor of party identification, we should also expect veterans to be more likely to identify with (and thus vote for) the Republican Party.
The causal relationship may also work in another way. That is, the institutional Unfortunately, we would need individual-level panel data to differentiate fully between these two mechanisms. However, we can test a number of hypotheses relating to the expected ideology, party identification, and issue positions of veterans, relative to the general public.
In particular, we test three related hypotheses, derived from the theory outlined above.
Hypothesis 1:
Veterans will identify more strongly than the general public with conservatism and the Republican Party.
Hypothesis 2:
Veterans will be more likely than the general public to support fiscally conservative and socially liberal policy positions.
Hypothesis 3:
Veterans will be more likely than the general public to support the use of military force.
Testing these three hypotheses allow us to investigate the nature of observed differences between veterans and non-veterans, in accordance with the duty-based theory of citizenship, and
gain understanding of what policies produced by an all-veteran electorate would look like.
Research Design
In order to understand the differences between the policy output of an all-veteran electorate and that of our own, it is necessary to compare public opinion among volunteer military veterans to that of non-veterans. This provides a clearer picture of how an all-volunteer citizenry might be expected to feel about various important issues. To the extent that policy responds to public opinion, it can also suggest what policy would look like in a world with a Heinleinian conception of citizenship.
Comparing public opinion among veterans and the electorate as a whole requires a national survey of political opinions on important policy questions that inquires about veteran status.
The 2006 CCES serves this purpose well. 32 It is a national stratified sample survey of more than 30,000 Americans, with questions about both domestic and foreign policy issues.
Importantly, it provides demographic information on respondents, including current or former military service. This allows us to assess the opinions of both veterans and non-veterans on a number of major issues. By using this data set, we avoid the pitfalls of previous studies, with a broad sample of both groups drawn from the mass public, and a wide range of issues on which the respondents were polled.
Because we are interested in attitudes of citizens in both possible electorates, we begin by dropping all non-citizens from the survey. Fortunately, this is a relatively small subset, accounting for just over 1% of the sample, leaving us with a total of 35,947 observations.
Next, because we want to assess duty-based citizenship, we create a dummy variable for veteran status. Veteran status ideally gets at the two concepts described earlier: self-selection into the military, and civic virtue instilled by training and other experience. While all veterans would receive any socialization effects, both socialization and selection factors should be present only in volunteer veterans. The bureaucracy chosen by a veteran electorate not only eschews the draft, but "recruiters" actively attempt to discourage individuals from joining. 33 Unfortunately, the CCES does not ask respondents whether they volunteered or were conscripted. Furthermore, during the conscription era, the self-selection mechanism may be polluted by "reluctant volunteers," who choose to enlist rather than wait to be drafted, in order to receive better assignments, and would not have volunteered otherwise. 34 Additionally, the US military offers inducements for enlistment (e.g., money for college), which produces veterans who may not be entirely motivated by civic virtue. However, this should only indicate that any suggestive findings would be stronger in the absence of s u ch inducements.
To ensure that we do not bias the analysis in favor of our hypotheses, our sample of veterans includes only those individuals who have previously served in the military and could not have been drafted (i.e., all males born after 1952, and all females). 35 Henceforth, we will use "veterans" to refer to this group, and "all veterans" to refer to all individuals with prior military service. A description of this nomenclature, and the portion of the data that each category represents can be found in Table 1 . An important point is that we do not include individuals currently engaged in military service in our group of veterans. Rather these respondents are referred to as "active duty" servicemembers and treated differently. Theoretically, this is because the effects of duty-based citizenship show themselves only when service has ended. The reason for the policy decision, given in the novel by Cpl. Rico, is that, given the opportunity, "the idiots might vote not to make a drop." 36 That is, the Federation may fear that soldiers might choose self-preservation over what is best for society by acting in an especially dovish manner. 37 However, the Federation may simply find the possibility (however unlikely) that rank-and-file military could overturn their orders to be an offense against the all-important principles of military discipline and duty. This suggests a question about how veterans' beliefs on foreign policy differ from currently-serving soldiers (Gelpi and Feaver note that they tend to track relatively closely), which is testable in our data set. The military policy issue that we examine was setting a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq.
These topics make up the universe of policy questions asked on the CCES. They are useful for the analysis in that they all came up for roll call votes during the 109th Congress, and generally represented the important questions of the day. Thus, respondents should be especially likely to have meaningful opinions about them. The situations in which respondents are asked whether they would support military force include: securing an oil supply, destroying a terrorist camp, stopping a genocide, spreading democracy, protecting allies, and assisting the United Nations.
Respondents are also asked if they believe that none of these situations justifies the use of military force. The wording and coding for all of these questions can be found in the Appendix.
The survey also includes questions about ideological self-placement (five-point scale) and party identification (seven-point scale).
As we are interested in the difference between public opinion in our electorate and in a veteran-only electorate, we want to compare the opinions of veterans on these questions to those of non-veterans, as well as to those of the electorate as a whole. Given this goal and the wording of the questions on the CCES survey, the obvious way of investigating the research question is by comparing responses between the various groups. Thus, our analysis involves examining the mean placements on party identification and ideology measures, as well as the proportion of each group that favors or opposes a given policy stance. Simple difference-ofmeans and difference-of-proportions tests can indicate whether veterans' views are significantly different from those of the public at large. We use this approach to compare subsets of the U.S. electorate, and later discuss the potential for more sophisticated research designs, given additional data.
Demographics
Before looking specifically at the political views of veterans, we find it informative to examine the more general demographic characteristics of veterans, relative to the entire CCES sample.
These comparisons will add context to the initial examination of political attitudes and characteristics. In particular, we look at gender, race, marital status, church attendance, income, education, and age. Table 2 describes the CCES data, in terms of gender, race, and marital status, comparing veterans to all individuals surveyed. What is perhaps most notable about the table is the fact that veterans are overwhelmingly male. Although females account for more than half of the individuals in the overall CCES survey, they make up less than 30% of the sample' s veteran respondents. 39 Contrary to some beliefs, veterans also appear to be slightly wealthier than their non-veteran counterparts. Finally, the median members of both groups attend church less than once a month and had some college education, suggesting no real difference between the two. The differences that we have identified with respect to demographic characteristics are not consistent with any particular ideological association. As veterans are more likely to be male, more likely to be married, and have a higher median income, they might be expected to be more conservative. On the other hand, veterans are younger and more likely to be minorities, both of which are generally correlated with more liberal leanings, which should temper the effects of the other demographic indicators. Perhaps most interesting about this preliminary analysis, however, is that veterans tend to be a diverse group that is relatively highly educated and wealthy. This seems to contrast with popular claims that military recruitment exploits undereducated and poor minorities, 40 such as John Kerry's 2006 warning to California high school students that they must study hard and do their homework or risk getting "stuck in Iraq." 41 Having examined the demographic characteristics of veterans, we now turn to an analysis of self-assessed ideology and party identification. Both conventional wisdom and Hypothesis 1 (which draws from Heinlein's theory) suggest that veterans should be more conservative and more Republican than the population at large. Our results bear this out.
Using the conventional five-point ideological self-placement measure, in which a 1 indicates that the respondent is very liberal and a 5 indicates that the individual is very conservative, the overall mean is 3.18, while the mean among veterans is a more conservative 3.35.
Similarly, on the seven-point party identification self-placement measure, for which a 1 is a strong Democrat and a 7 is a strong Republican, the overall mean is 3.94, while the mean among veterans is 4.34. In both of these cases, a s p re d i c t e d b y H yp o t h e s i s 1 , the difference is statistically discernible, and indicates that the average veteran is significantly to the right of the average adult citizen. Our initial results indicate than an America in which only veterans gained the franchise would be a more conservative America.
Ideology and party identification, however, are relatively crude measures and can allow for a wide range of variance on actual policy issues. This is especially true in the area of foreign policy, where conservative Republicans may be divided over interventionist versus isolationist policies, and hawkish liberal Democrats may disagree with their more dovish copartisans. The fact that foreign policy issues are likely to be especially salient for veterans dictates that we dig deeper, comparing preferences on specific policy questions.
Preferences Over Policy
Our initial policy analysis involves looking at the proportion of each group that responds in the affirmative to a given question in roll call format. We obtain the proportions for veterans, 42 non-veterans, and the electorate as a whole, and then compare these quantities. A necessary condition for an expectation of different policy in a veteran-only electorate would be that the proportion of the present electorate in favor of a policy be significantly different from the proportion of veterans in favor of the same policy. More interesting would be a case in which a majority of one group favors a policy, while a majority of the other opposes it.
We begin by looking at policy questions. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4 . In almost all cases, we find that, in the aggregate, veterans' preferences differ significantly from those of non-veterans and the electorate in general. The one exception to this trend is support for CAFTA, which is virtually the same for the two groups. 43 In addition to the two groups having different levels of support for various policies, we can see that the break is ideological in nature. For each policy on which the two groups differ, veterans appear to be significantly more conservative, both fiscally and socially. This runs counter to Hypothesis 2, in that veterans do not appear to be more socially liberal than the general public; however, it supports the conventional wisdom that veterans tend to be a more conservative group than voters in general.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the largest difference between groups is on a policy that deals explicitly with the military: whether or not a timetable should h a v e been set for withdrawal from Iraq. Here, we find that support among the general electorate was roughly 20% higher than it was among veterans. However, in both groups, majorities expressed support for withdrawal. While opinion might have been more tepid in an electorate comprised of veterans, the general preferences on this issue would h a v e been the same. This is the case with almost every question. Generally, while veterans are more conservative, the difference is not large enough to put majorities of the two groups on opposing sides. The only case in which we see this is on the extension of capital gains tax cuts. Here, most veterans express support for such cuts, while a minority (47%) of the nonveterans as a whole prefers to eliminate them. However, even here, we would not expect to have seen a policy shift, as Congress ultimately voted to extend the capital gains tax cuts through 2010.
The results from the analysis of opinion on military questions is presented in Table 5 .
Here, we find that veterans' views are significantly different from those of the electorate on every question, and that the results are supportive of Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, however, the magnitude of the differences are substantially smaller. The largest difference (eight percentage points) is on the relatively uncontroversial situation in which the military is used to destroy a terrorist camp, which is supported by more than 70% of the electorate, and nearly 80% of veterans. Moreover, the average difference between the two is about five percentage points on military questions, and about six points on policy questions, indicating that the two groups are slightly closer on military issues.
Once again, we can see a general direction in which the differences between the groups run.
Veterans tend to be more hawkish than the electorate as a whole, being more likely to support the use of military force in all situations but one: assisting the United Nations. Fewer than half of veterans support the use of military force to help the United Nations uphold international law. It is not clear whether this is because veterans are more reluctant to subordinate the military to an international force, whether, being generally more conservative, they tend to be mistrustful of the U.N., or whether it is a combination of both of these factors.
As with the policy questions, majorities of the two groups tend to lean in the same direction, despite the differences in aggregate levels of support. Here, use of the military in a supporting for the U.N. is the sole instance in which the groups lean in different directions (and again, the majority opposed is between 49 and 50%). While policy based solely on veteran opinions might be slightly more hawkish, we do not generally see differences in the median for each group, and so we would likely see similar outcomes.
We also see that there are fewer differences between veterans and their active duty counterparts on military issues. Veterans and active duty servicemembers only have distinguishable opinions regarding military action in the situations where the military is used to destroy a terrorist camp, prevent genocide, or spread democracy. In these scenarios, the active duty servicemembers are substantially more hawkish than veterans. The concern that "the idiots might vote not to make a drop" appears to have little supporting evidence. In fact, in situations in which the military is asked to prevent genocide or spread democracy, the difference in hawkishness between active duty and veterans is greater than the difference between veterans and the electorate as a whole. Thus, inclusion of active duty servicemembers into an otherwise veteran-only electorate would likely lead to somewhat more hawkish policies, but in no case would the inclusion of active duty servicemembers cause the median citizen to change position.
Discussion
The results of our analysis provide partial support for the hypotheses derived from the duty-based theory of citizenship outlined earlier in this paper. As hypothesized, veterans tend to be relatively hawkish supporters of free market policies; however, they are also unexpectedly conservative with respect to social issues. These findings suggest an alternative (but related) manner in which the emphasis that military service places on duty (whether a result of selection or socialization) may influence political beliefs. If veterans believe that duty is a paramount trait or virtue and they exhibit this trait to a degree that civilians do not, then veterans may be willing to utilize government intervention to make up for the perceived moral shortcomings of civilians. This alternative theory of how duty drives the political opinions of veteran citizens is consistent with our finding that veterans hold socially conservative ideological beliefs, which are in concordance with government policies that place a high priority on duty, discipline, and deference to authority or established norms. On fiscal issues, on the other hand, veterans may believe that a small group of dutiful individuals are capable of providing adequate voluntary funds for the provision of public goods while others free ride. Individuals who volunteer to join the military may be willing to provide other volunteer members of the military with a significant amount of forebearance on social issues, or preventing some intolerable public "bads," while insisting on stricter restrictions on the behavior of non-veterans, who do not demonstrate dutiful, and thus moral, behavior. While we have primarily addressed the theory that military service is associated with particular issue positions through a worldview built around a strong individual sense of duty, it is also possible that a strong sense of duty acts to draw veterans toward identities which value duty, and that their relatively homogenous issue positions emerge from the mindsets inculcated by these identities.
Further research is needed to assess this new theory, and we outline some fruitful next steps below.
The results of our analysis of volunteers present an important challenge to some previous studies. Gelpi and Feaver argued that veteran political elites---specifically members of Congress---and military elites were more reluctant to engage in force than non-veteran political elites. 44 Our study of the mass public suggest that veterans are instead more willing to use force for a variety of purposes than the civilian public. This is a puzzle which warrants further study, as the exposure of servicemen and veterans to additional methods of achieving national security objectives as they reach positions of power may be inculcating dovishness.
The vote choice literature on veterans shows mixed results, and our study finds support for Bishin and Incantalupo's finding that veterans as a whole identify more strongly with the Republican party than does the civilian public, 45 and important bloc of voters. However, unlike these other groups, the study of veteran politics has been mostly limited to questions of turnout rates and the effects of veteran status on candidacies for political office, rather than questions about policy preferences at the mass level.
Even leaving aside the fact that veterans are a large, and politically active part of the population, it seems to us that it is worthwhile to learn more about the political beliefs of a group of individuals who are willing, if need be, to sacrifice their lives on behalf of their country. Our analysis is meant to serve as a first step toward learning more about veterans'
attitudes. We present our findings to make an argument that the political study of military veterans is both important and worthwhile, but much remains to be done. The initial analysis presented here relies on summary statistics and simple difference-of-means and difference-ofproportions testing. Future research should include regression analysis to control for potential confounding factors; however, this is difficult given current data. One particular problem with our analysis was our inability to distinguish between conscripts, volunteers, and reluctant volunteers prior to 1973. This confounds our ability to draw inferences about the effect of service as a selection mechanism. Moreover, simple regressions based on the data currently available would likely be afflicted by selection bias. An alternative would be to use matching estimators to look for treatment (i.e., socialization) effects. However, these are equally untenable, as pre-treatment variables are scarce. The study of veteran politics, much like the study of education and citizenship, revolves around isolating selection and socialization effects. Addressing these questions requires the collection of panel data on individuals before, during, and after they serve in the military. 
